Academic Freedom in the USA
Copyright 1999, 2000 by Ronald B. Standler
Table of Contents
Introduction
History of academic freedom
Two kinds of academic freedom
Judicial recognition of academic freedom
Criticism of legal basis for academic freedom in First Amendment
Is the First Amendment a proper basis for Academic Freedom?
special privileges in egalitarian democracy
No protection for wayward professor
Academic freedom does not apply to ...
Legal Barriers
Is Academic Freedom different in different disciplines?
Conclusion
Short bibliography
Introduction
The conventional wisdom, including statements by the U.S. Supreme Court,
has academic freedom as a legal right, derived from the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. I believe that this conventional wisdom is
wrong.
I am not the only attorney holding this unconventional view.
One scholarly article on academic freedom in the USA, written by a professor
at the Georgetown University Law Center, began:
- The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple
proposition stands explicit or implicit in numerous judicial
opinions, often proclaimed in fervid rhetoric. Attempts to understand
the scope and foundation of a constitutional guarantee of academic
freedom, however, generally result in paradox or confusion.
The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are inconclusive, the promise of
rhetoric reproached by the ambiguous realities of academic life.
- The problems are fundamental: There has been no adequate
analysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or
of why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding principle,
the doctrine floats in law, picking up decisions as a hull does
barnacles.
- J. Peter Byrne, "Academic Freedom", 99 Yale Law Journal 251, 252-253 (1989).
Academic freedom is an amorphous quasi-legal concept that is neither
precisely defined nor convincingly justified from legal principles.
These two defects make the law of academic freedom difficult to understand.
I have no doubt that academic freedom is important and desirable.
My concern is that professors in the USA may believe that academic
freedom is a valid legal doctrine with power and vitality, when
in fact
it is often only empty rhetoric by professors and judges.
In practice, the notion of academic freedom is invoked to justify
statements by faculty that offend politicians, religious leaders,
corporate executives, parents of students, and citizens.
Such offense is easy to understand, given that professors are often
intellectual risk-takers, ahead of their time, and loyal to Truth
wherever it may lead and whoever it may offend
instead of loyal to money, political or corporate power, and dogma.
History of academic freedom
In medieval Europe, universities were self-governing enclaves
that were outside the civil law. Some of this isolation
survives today in poorly articulated views that universities
are somehow immune from law. Perhaps the fact that large
universities have their own police department gives some support
to the notion of independence. Regardless of whatever myths may circulate in
academic communities, the same law applies to colleges and universities
in the USA that applies to people in other settings in the USA.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)("At the outset
we note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune
from the sweep of the First Amendment.")
The legal concept of academic freedom originated in Germany around 1850,
so it is not an ancient concept.
The Prussian Constitution of 1850 declared that "science and its teaching
shall be free."
In Germany, academic freedom is known as Lehrfreiheit
the right of faculty to teach on any subject.
There are two related concepts in Germany:
(1) Freiheit der Wissenschaft, freedom of scientific research, and
(2) Lernfreiheit, the right of students to attend any lectures,
and the absence of class roll calls.
This kind of academic freedom has never been a major issue in the USA,
owing to differences between the two countries:
- In Germany, there are no required classes for university students,
and just one examination to obtain the Diplom degree.
In the USA, curriculum is rigidly controlled by faculty, and students
must attend all of the required classes and a minimum number of
"elective" classes, to qualify for a degree.
There is typically at least one examination in every class in the USA.
- The German constitution of 23 May 1949, Art. 7 explicitly declares that
education and all teaching is under the control of the Federal Education Minister.
The German constitution of 23 May 1949, Art. 5, cl. 3
explicitly mentions that "Art and science, research and teaching are free."
In the USA, the federal constitution does not mention education;
only a few state constitutions (e.g., California and Michigan)
mention education.
Americans during the 1800's who desired a doctoral degree typically
went to Europe and studied at a university in England, France, or Germany.
In 1876, Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore was founded along the
design of German universities at Göttingen and Berlin,
which emphasized scholarly research by professors.
Other universities in the USA were soon founded along the same lines:
for example, the University of Chicago in 1890 and the
California Institute of Technology in 1891.
During this time, older American institutions of higher education
(e.g., Harvard, Princeton) evolved
to include the German idea of a university as a place for scholarly
research, as well as teaching of undergraduates.
In 1915, the newly formed American Association of University Professors
issued their first report on academic freedom.
Two kinds of academic freedom
There are two distinctly different kinds of academic freedom, which
should have distinct names:
- Individual academic freedom protects an individual professor.
- Institutional academic freedom protects universities
from interference by government, a right that applies to the
community of scholars, not to individual faculty.
The following people have commented on the problem of using "academic freedom"
to mean two different concepts.
- Judge Posner, writing for the unanimous panel of three judges in
Piarowski v. Illinois Community College,
759 F.2d 625, 629 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007.
- Prof. Walter P. Metzger, 66 Texas Law Review 1265, 1266-67, 1314 (1988).
- Prof. J. Peter Byrne, 99 Yale Law Journal 251, 255, 257 (1989).
Individual Academic Freedom
A general expression of individual academic freedom is included in the "1940
Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure" by the
American Association of University Professors
(AAUP).
This Statement by the AAUP has no legal effect, but the AAUP publicly
censures
colleges and universities that they believe have violated academic freedom.
However, all major colleges and universities have adopted this Statement,
or a variation of this Statement, which is contained in the faculty policy
manual of each college or university,
and is incorporated by reference in the employment contract
between the university and each individual faculty member.
In many cases, individual academic freedom is simply part of academic tradition
the routine way that faculty committees, department chairmen, and deans
operate when they make judgments about who to hire, who to promote, who gets tenure,
who gets larger salary increases, and who gets their employment terminated.
ASIDE:
In my ten years as a professor, the most egregious violations of academic
freedom that I saw were committed by department chairmen who had spent all of
their previous professional career as an employee of either industry or a
government laboratory: these chairmen had neither understanding nor
respect for academic freedom, they saw professors as mere employees who
they rigidly managed.
Individual academic freedom is a relationship between professors
and the university administration.
terse remarks about tenure
I note in passing that the AAUP mixes the concepts of academic freedom
and tenure. While this essay is not about tenure, I should
briefly explain the legal effect of tenure. When a professor receives
tenure, the professor is converted from an "at-will employee"
(i.e., an employee whose contract can be easily ended,
without the need for the employer to give a reason)
to a "for cause" employee
whose employment can be ended only for good reason(s)
shown at an hearing before a committee of other professors at the
same institution, followed by review by the administration.
The effect of tenure is to
make it very difficult for university administration to end the employment
of a tenured professor, thus insulating tenured professors from criticism.
The benefits of tenure are contract rights, granted by the university
administration.
The AAUP and university policy manuals plainly say
concepts of academic freedom apply equally to all professors,
both tenured and untenured. Given the probationary status of tenure-track
faculty, it is obvious that it is only an ideal that tenure-track
professors have the same academic freedom as tenured professors.
While tenure for professors may appear as an extraordinarily good deal,
it is essentially the same as permanent employment in the federal civil
service or the lifetime tenure of judges in federal courts.
internal university operation
A significant part of individual academic freedom is not
a legal concept, but dependent on the internal culture among faculty
and management (e.g., Department Chairmen,
Deans, the Chancellor, and their administrative staff) at a university.
Tersely stated, the management of a university gives minimal supervision
to teaching and research by faculty, except when problems occur, or when
a faculty member is being evaluated for promotion, tenure, or salary increases.
The faculty are trusted to do their job competently and professionally.
In return, the creative intellectuals on the faculty flourish in this
atmosphere of minimal supervision.
Freedom from detailed supervision is not a license to relax.
Each professor is responsible for meeting his/her classes
(or arranging for a substitute),
teaching competently, and producing a substantial series of scholarly
publications. In departments of science, engineering, and medicine,
professors are also expected to write research proposals that attract
external funding for their research, including equipment and supplies,
half-time salary support during the academic year and full-time salary
support during the summer "vacation", financial support for their
graduate students, and overhead that pays for the university's operation
(e.g., libraries and maintenance of buildings).
Far from being a relaxed environment, it is truly a sink or swim environment.
Faculty choose their own textbooks. The syllabus for required courses is
set by a departmental curriculum committee, composed only of professors.
It is considered highly inappropriate for a professor or administrator
to tell a faculty member what grade to assign to a student.
The sense of independence is so strong among faculty, that it is often
difficult to discuss teaching methods, because no faculty member wants
to be accused of criticizing another.
Faculty are active participants in setting all academic rules and
regulations, as well as in selecting new faculty members, granting tenure, etc.
The use of faculty committees to make the first-level decision means
nearly all decisions by university administration have the support of
the majority of affected faculty. This is distinct from industrial practice
in the USA, where policy is made by managers and major decisions generally
come down the chain of command.
The university is a community of scholars who value freedom of inquiry
and individual choice,
not a profit-making corporation that demands adherence to policy
made by professional managers.
The academic ideal is that there is tolerance, if not genuine respect,
by both the administration and faculty for differences of
opinion, methods, style, and personality among the faculty.
To some extent, this tolerance of unconventional views and personality
is the natural result of an enlightened community: tolerating
eccentric personalities of other people means that
one's own mannerisms will also be tolerated.
Further, professors tend to work as individuals, not in industrial-style
teams, so it does not matter if professors are compatible with each other.
As in other areas of life, more management and control means less freedom.
It is the same in the university. Surprisingly, scholarly articles on
"academic freedom" rarely mention freedom from management as an important
feature of academic freedom.
The U.S. Supreme Court used this collegial working environment to hold
that professors at Yeshiva University in New York City were managerial,
not employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act,
and hence the University was not required to bargain with a labor
union that represented the professors.
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (1978), aff'd 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
"Budget requests prepared by the senior professor
in each subject area receive the 'perfunctory' approval of the Dean
'99 percent' of the time and have never been rejected by the central
administration."
Id. note 3 at 676.
"... the faculty at each school effectively determine its curriculum,
grading system, admission and matriculation standards, academic
calendars, and course schedules."
Id. at 676, see also at 686.
The Court noted that professors "make recommendations to the Dean or
Director in every case of faculty hiring,
tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion."
"One Dean estimated that 98% of faculty hiring recommendations were
ultimately given effect."
Id. at 677, see also note 23 at 686.
The Court accepted the view that "the faculty is the school".
Id. note 4 at 676 and note 10 at 681.
Institutional Academic Freedom
Institutional academic freedom reserves to the university itself
selection of faculty and students, as well as issues in curriculum,
such as the content of the syllabus in each class.
Institutional academic freedom does not protect individual professors
with unorthodox views from dismissal by the university administration,
although institutional academic freedom does protect professors from
dismissal by legislators or politicians.
The clearest definition of institutional academic freedom in the USA appears in
a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, where it is said that academic
freedom means that the university can "determine for itself on
academic grounds:
- who may teach
- what may be taught
- how it shall be taught, and
- who may be admitted to study."
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
Quoted with approval in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
This statement first appeared in a concurring opinion,
which is not law,
by Justice Frankfurter in a 1957 U.S. Supreme Court case,
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
Amazingly, Justice Frankfurter quoted this definition from a statement
of academics in South Africa, which shows that academic freedom
was literally a foreign concept to judges in the USA as late as 1957.
In 1957, some professors were ambivalent about legal protection for academic
freedom, because these professors trusted neither judges nor politicians
to determine (or to review) academic decisions.
J. Peter Byrne, "Academic Freedom", 99 Yale Law Journal 251, 291 (1989);
Robert K. Carr, "Academic Freedom, the American Association of University
Professors, and the United States Supreme Court",
45 AAUP Bulletin 5, 6, 19-20 (1959).
conflict between the two kinds of freedom
As one would expect when there are two independent concepts,
they sometimes conflict with each other:
- We may assume, however, that public colleges do not have carte
blanche to regulate the expression of ideas by faculty members in the parts
of the college that are not public forums. We state this as an assumption
rather than a conclusion because, though many decisions describe "academic freedom"
as an aspect of the freedom of speech that is protected against governmental
abridgment by the First Amendment, the term is equivocal. It is used to
denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without
interference from the government ...
and the freedom of the individual teacher ...
to pursue his ends without interference from the academy;
and these two freedoms are in conflict, as in this case.
- Piarowski v. Illinois Community College,
759 F.2d 625, 629 (1985)[many citations omitted],
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007.
Judicial recognition of academic freedom
The first reported judicial opinion in the USA to mention "academic
freedom" was a horrible decision of a New York State court.
The City College of New York had appointed the distinguished
philosopher, Bertrand Russell, to its faculty.
A grieved taxpayer filed suit, because of Prof. Russell's allegedly
immoral views, and, despite her having no standing
to present this case to the court, the court heard her.
Even worse, during a hearing on a summary judgment motion by
the College, the judge received evidence and, two days later,
made a decision on the merits of the case. The judge announced that
- It is contended that Bertrand Russell is extraordinary.
That makes him the more dangerous.
The philosophy of Mr. Russell and his conduct in the past is in
direct conflict and in violation of the Penal Law of the State
of New York. When we consider how susceptible the human mind is
to the ideas and philosophy of teaching professors,
it is apparent that the Board of Higher Education either disregarded
the probable consequences of their acts or were more concerned with
advocating a cause that appeared to them to present a challenge to
so-called 'academic freedom' without according suitable
consideration of the other aspects of the problem before them. While this
court would not interfere with any action of the board in so far as a pure
question of 'valid' academic freedom is concerned, it will not tolerate
academic freedom being used as a cloak to promote the popularization in
the minds of adolescents of acts forbidden by the Penal Law. This
appointment affects the public health, safety and morals of the
community and it is the duty of the court to act.
Academic freedom does not mean academic license.
It is the freedom to do good and not to teach evil.
- Kay v. Board of Education, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 (1940).
The judge then revoked the appointment of Prof. Russell to the faculty.
Despite the two outrageous errors of civil procedure,
as well as the ridiculousness of the reasoning on the merits of the case,
the appellate courts denied the Board of Education a hearing.
Kay v. Board of Education, 29 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1940).
This case is notable for demonstrating why judges should not
interfere with academic decisions.
Not surprisingly, this case spawned critical articles
in law reviews:
Hamilton, "Trial by Ordeal, New Style," 50 Yale Law Journal 778 (1941);
Note, 53 Harvard Law Review 1192 (1940).
The first use of the phrase "academic freedom" in an opinion of
the U.S. Supreme Court was only in 1952, and then only
in a dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, which is not law.
Douglas anticipated that the Supreme Court would consider academic freedom
to arise out of the First Amendment.
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952).
There is a concurring opinion in a U.S. Supreme Court case that
demonstrates clearly the kind of hysterical hyperbole that judges in the USA
have used about educators:
- To regard teachers in our entire educational system, from the
primary grades to the university as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to
indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of
open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens,
who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion.
Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by the very
atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and
free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for
the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must
have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning
of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic
dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and
circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of
understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of thought, of
speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States against infraction by national or State government.
- Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-197 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
When I first read this concurring opinion, I made a sarcastic remark
that not only are teachers "priests of our democracy", but we respect
teachers so highly that we make them, like priests, take a vow of poverty.
ASIDE: It is common to see professors of science or engineering
with an annual income only 1/2 to 2/3 of what less qualified
scientists or engineers earn as industrial employees.
Worse, the equipment in university laboratories is old and generally
obsolete, unlike equipment in industrial and government laboratories.
Professors of law or medicine are paid an even smaller fraction of
what they could earn in private practice.
The low salaries of professors may be the result of public perception
that professors lead an easy, idyllic life. The reality is that professors
at publish-or-perish universities often work 60 hours/week on
frustratingly difficult research problems that few people in the world
could solve.
Despite what Justice Frankfurter says, his statement is hyperbole.
The first majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court to mention
academic freedom involved a Marxist journalist (not a professor)
who gave one guest lecture at the University of New Hampshire,
then was interrogated by the Attorney General of the State of
New Hampshire about those lectures, among other topics.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
The following words from the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren
are often quoted:
- We believe that there unquestionably was an
invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and
political expression areas in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread.
- The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
- Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
- Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to be
condemned. The absence of such voices would be a symptom of
grave illness in our society.
- Id. at 251.
Sweezy was not a professor, but only a guest lecturer for one day.
Wyman v. Sweezy, 121 A.2d 783, 786, 788 (NH 1956).
The U.S. Supreme Court completely ignored this fact.
This is a critical point, because a professor is hired only after
a detailed examination of credentials by a faculty committee,
department chairman, and dean, while a guest lecturer is invited
by a single professor without any review or approval by the college.
Thus Justice Warren's rhetoric is not relevant to the issue
before the Court, since Sweezy was not an academic, so this case
is not about academic freedom, and any remarks about academic
freedom are, at best, only obiter dicta.
See the insightful analysis by Prof. Katheryn Katz in her article,
"The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive
Activity in the University Classroom: A Constitutional Myth,"
16 Univ. Calif. Davis Law Review 857, 902-905 (1983).
Nonetheless, eight years after Sweezy, Justice Douglas
writing for the majority in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
wrote that Wieman v. Updegraff enunciated the principle of
"freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach"
and that Sweezy and two other cases stood for
"the freedom of the entire university community."
Douglas' assertion is simply wrong about both Wieman and Sweezy.
Wieman was a case about a loyalty oath that all
employees of the Oklahoma state government were required to take.
The only mention of "freedom of inquiry" in Wieman occurs
in an concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter, which is not law.
The phrase "freedom to teach" appears nowhere either in the majority opinion or
in the concurring opinions in Wieman.
Douglas' incorrect assertions about the holdings in
Wieman and Sweezy are not just bad scholarship,
but are essentially deceptive. I strongly believe that the Court reached
the correct result in the Wieman, Sweezy, and Griswold
cases, but law is about more than getting the "right result"
in individual cases. Law is also about having a clear expression
of a principle or reason for whatever result is obtained.
The principle or reason is what guides judges and attorneys
in the future as they work with cases that involve slightly different
facts from the precedents.
The most quoted legal statement of academic freedom in the USA
was written in 1967 by Justice Brennan:
- Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom.
- Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Quoted with approval in
Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990);
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982);
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968).
Prof. Metzger suggests that Brennan's rhetoric compared dismissal
of allegedly subversive people from schools and universities in the USA
with policies of the Nazi and Soviet governments.
Walter P. Metzger, "Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America", 66 Texas Law Review 1265, 1293 (1988).
Hence, phrases like "pall of orthodoxy" are rhetoric, not a
statement of law. A Court of Appeals apparently agreed, when it said
- Keyishian dealt with that brand of regulation most offensive
to a free society: loyalty oaths. The [U.S. Supreme] Court's
pronouncements about academic freedom in that context, however,
cannot be extrapolated to deny schools command of their own courses.
- Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11thCir. 1991).
Criticism of legal basis for academic freedom
really about First Amendment
But when the fancy prose is peeled away, most of the
so-called "academic freedom" cases are really about either:
- the government's suppression of political speech (e.g., publicly
criticizing school administration), for example:
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
(Another of my essays discusses the
Pickering
case in detail.)
- the government's interference with freedom of association,
(e.g., loyalty oaths, membership in "subversive organizations" such as
the Communist Party), for example:
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
- the government's endorsement of religion (e.g., directing that
schools teach the Biblical theory of creation), for example:
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
In other words, these "academic freedom" cases are about the government's
violation of the rights that apply to all people in the USA,
rights that are stated in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
For example, see:
- If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
- West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Given these rights are protected for everyone in the USA,
not just professors, it is not necessary for a judge
to invoke the doctrine of academic freedom.
Only a few reported opinions of courts in the USA explicitly
recognize that the doctrine of academic freedom is unnecessary.
The following cases are noteworthy for their candor:
- Hillis v. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5thCir. 1982),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)
("While academic freedom is well recognized,
its perimeters are ill-defined and the case law defining
it is inconsistent. Its roots have been found in the first
amendment insofar as it protects against infringements
on a teacher's freedom concerning classroom content and method.").
- Mahoney v. Hankin, 593 F.Supp. 1171, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
("Yet, while academic freedom is recognized as a special concern of the first
amendment, its parameters are not well-defined, especially with regard
to a teacher's speech within the classroom.
While the Supreme Court has developed the Pickering balance
for a teacher's speech outside the classroom, no such balance
or standard has been formulated by the Court for speech inside
the classroom. As a result lower courts have applied somewhat varying
standards.").
- Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F.Supp. 1407,
1412-1413 (C.D. Calif. 1995)("The concept of academic freedom,
however, is more clearly established in academic literature
than it is in the courts.").
Is the First Amendment a proper basis for Academic Freedom?
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, said that academic freedom is
"a special concern of the First Amendment".
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
While this bald assertion is the law in the USA, since it comes from the
highest court in the USA and has not been overturned,
it is not a reasonable statement.
Prof. Katz has argued the U.S. Supreme Court's flamboyant rhetoric
about academic freedom being part of freedom of speech is wrong:
- ... utterances are almost always relevant to a professor's worth.
.... These sweeping statements [of the Supreme Court]
are not consistent with the whole of the Court's first amendment
jurisprudence and are nonsense in an academic setting.
- Katheryn Katz, "The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive
Activity in the University Classroom: A Constitutional Myth,"
16 Univ. Calif. Davis Law Review 857, 926 (1983).
Prof. Byrne has argued that academic freedom is not
properly derived from the First Amendment, because
First Amendment law developed by the U.S. Supreme Court
was intended to apply to political speech, in which the government and courts
refuse to consider truth or falsity. As Byrne says, "Such an approach
mechanically imports norms from political society into the academic context."
However, as Prof. Byrne observes,
it is a fundamental part of academic life to criticize professors for
the content of their speech: "It is of the essence that worthy ideas be
distinguished from dull."
J. Peter Byrne, "Academic Freedom", 99 Yale Law Journal 251, 309-310 (1989).
Consider for a moment what the U.S. Supreme Court means by freedom of speech.
A famous passage from a U.S. Supreme Court opinion declares that
- We begin with the common ground.
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. ....
- The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order
to protect speech that matters.
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-341 (1974);
quoted with approval in
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994);
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988);
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984);
Old Dominion Branch v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974).
Does the Supreme Court mean that we must tolerate, in the name of freedom
of speech, a professor of geography who claims that the Earth is really
flat and is carried through space on the back of a giant beetle?
In mathematics, physics, chemistry, and other sciences
it is possible to prove an idea false, by demonstrating a contradiction.
It is much more difficult to prove an opinion by a professor
of history, philosophy, or music to be false.
This difference in subject matter makes it easier to require a
fundamental level of orthodoxy among
professors of mathematicians and scientists than among professors
of humanities and arts. I discuss other aspects of this issue
later in this document.
I have posted elsewhere at this web site an
essay that
discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's metaphor that truth should be
determined in the "marketplace of ideas",
not by politicians, not by judges, and not by government bureaucrats.
However, it is acceptable and proper for university faculty to
consider the content of their colleague's statements in making judgments
about hiring, promotion, tenure, and dismissal from employment.
Scholars are free to say or write whatever they want, but they must
also take responsibility for their expression. If scholars make
a mistake or do sloppy work, then their reputation will properly suffer.
state action
Finally, the First Amendment only protects speech from regulation
by government. If academic freedom is truly derived from the
First Amendment, then there is no legal basis for protecting academic
freedom at private universities, since a derived right can not have
broader applicability than its source.
Yet the conventional dogma is that professors at private universities
(with the possible exception of universities operated by a religious group)
have the same academic freedom as universities that are
operated by state or local governments. This contradiction needs
a resolution. I suggest that academic freedom is not derived
from the First Amendment.
An alternative view is that institutional academic freedom is
derived from the First Amendment and that private universities have
no need for institutional academic freedom, because private universities
are not dependent on government's financial support
(except for research contracts from government agencies)
and are not under direct governmental control.
However, from a historical perspective, it seems clear that
institutional academic freedom comes from a doctrine of academic
abstention, as is discussed in my separate
essay.
Further, the First Amendment protects speech of people,
not institutions
hence, the First Amendment can only be a possible source
of individual academic freedom, not institutional academic freedom.
special privileges in egalitarian democracy
The Dean of the University of Texas Law school said:
- ... I am deeply troubled by the concept of academic freedom
defined in terms of the intellectual autonomy of the professor.
In particular, how does the claim to academic freedom rise to the
level of a constitutional entitlement under the first amendment
to the Constitution?
- Mark Yudof, "Three Faces of Academic Freedom,"
32 Loyola Law Review 831, 837 (1987).
- He then goes on criticize the idea that professors should have
greater autonomy than other professions:
- ... why do not engineers at NASA have the constitutional right
to engineer rockets in the most efficient, productive and
self-realizing manner even if their managers and the Congress
disagree with them?
- Id. at 840.
Given that the USA is an egalitarian democracy, there is no reason
to give a higher level of civil liberties for behavior by professors
than for the same behavior by ordinary adults.
It is an important and fundamental principle in the USA that the
same law apply equally to everyone, a principle that suggests that
one occupational group (e.g., professors) should not have greater rights than
another occupational group.
On the other hand, one could argue that journalists are a special
class under law (e.g., freedom of press, plus in some states
a legal privilege that journalists can not be compelled to disclose
names of their sources), not because journalists are noble, but
only in recognition of the benefit to a democratic society of
vigorous investigative journalism. Similarly, one could argue
that allowing, even encouraging, professors to experiment with new
ideas is beneficial to society.
Students have an enriched educational experience when they
are exposed to a wide variety of viewpoints and styles by different
professors, so academic freedom for professors arguably leads to
better education for students.
It is certainly true that discoveries
by scientists and engineers have resulted in improved
technology, and have been responsible for economic growth.
In particular, consider the high-tech industry located in
the Boston area (in the shadow of MIT, Harvard, Tufts, etc.),
Silicon Valley (in the shadow
of Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley),
and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina (in the shadow of
Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
While it is harder to quantify contributions of professors in the
arts and humanities to society, there is no doubt in my mind that such
contributions are also important.
Protection against termination of a professor's employment in
retaliation for a controversial remark on a political topic can
be accomplished in the employment contract between the professor
and university, without the need for a legal doctrine of academic freedom.
No Protection for Wayward Professor
Prof. Katz wrote:
- Despite its rhetoric about the glories of academic freedom,
the priesthood of teachers, and the value of robust and wide-open
debate in the classroom, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has relegated the
procedural rights of nonretained academicians to those of the
"common herd" of city, state, and federal employees.
Their procedural rights upon nonretention stand or fall with those
of public employees in particularly, and all who are aggrieved by
government action in general. Certainly, the Supreme Court has not
recognized any greater or more readily triggered due process rights
in faculty members than in government employees in general, even
though the safeguarding of first amendment expressive freedoms argues
for prophylactic measures.
- Katheryn Katz, "The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive
Activity in the University Classroom: A Constitutional Myth,"
16 Univ. Calif. Davis Law Review 857, 875 (1983).
[footnotes omitted]
This essay is not the place to discuss opinions of courts in
numerous cases brought by professors who were denied tenure or whose
employment contracts were not renewed.
However, mention of a few cases will show that, in practice, individual
academic freedom is illusory.
In 1970, Dr. Phyllis Hetrick's contract as a tenure-track
assistant professor of English at Eastern Kentucky University (EKU)
was not renewed. EKU gave as its reasons for nonrenewal of her contract:
- ... in an attempt to illustrate the "irony"
and "connotative qualities" of the English language, she told her freshman
students "I am an unwed mother." At the time, she was a divorced mother of
two, but she did not reveal that fact to her class.
- ... she apparently on occasion discussed the war in Vietnam
and the military draft with one of her freshman classes.
[The district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss,
mentioned that EKU accused her of engaging in draft counseling.
Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F.Supp. 545, 546 (E.D.Ky. 1971).
The Court of Appeals ignored the issue of such counseling.]
- She did not obtain her PhD until late in her second semester,
although she agreed that she would do so by the close of the first semester.
- She covered only 11 plays in her class, instead of the 20 to 25 plays
that the head of the English Department desired.
[This complaint is curious, because elsewhere Dr. Hetrick
was accused of having academic standards that were too high.]
Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 706 (6thCir. 1973).
These complaints by the EKU administration were clearly petty.
- The Court of Appeals noted that:
- The school administration considered the students as
generally unsophisticated and as having "somewhat restrictive backgrounds,"
and for this reason apparently expected the teachers to teach
on a basic level, to stress fundamentals and to
follow conventional teaching patterns
in a word, to "go by the book."
Plaintiff's evidence, on the other hand, tended to show that her teaching
emphasized student responsibility and freedom to organize class time and
out-of-class assignments in terms of student interest, all in an
effort, she claims to teach them how to think rather than merely to accept
and to parrot what they had heard.
- Id. at 707.
- The district court's memorandum opinion said:
- ... the evidence produced at the
hearing leads only to the conclusion that the University's
determination not to rehire was based solely
upon concern for her pedagogical attitudes.
Although the court is inclined to believe that the
classroom inadequacies that Dr. Hetrick was alleged to have displayed
inconclusive assignments,
extraneous classroom discussions, and insufficient coverage of
suggested materials were largely
superficial and thus easily correctable,
it is not the duty of the court to evaluate the wisdom of the
University's decision not to renew the contract.
It simply seems that Dr. Hetrick's teaching methods
were too progressive, or perhaps less orthodox than the other
faculty members in her department felt
were conducive to the achievement of the academic goals they espoused.
The court must conclude
that a State University has the authority to refuse to renew a
non-tenured professor's contract for the
reason that the teaching methods of that professor
do not conform with those of the tenured faculty
or with those approved of by the University.
- Id. at 708.
- There was no showing that Dr. Hetrick was incompetent, either
as an instructor or as a scholar.
The Court of Appeals noted that the
- district court found that even though the school administration
was concerned about the appropriateness of these occurrences,
"it does not appear that any of the faculty members felt that
Dr. Hetrick had on those particular occasions exceeded the bounds
of her teaching prerogative."
The student complaints during October and November 1969
allegedly centered on their inability to comprehend
what she was attempting to teach them or what was expected of them,
although no students were produced at trial to testify that
he or she had complained about or was dissatisfied with
plaintiff's teaching methods.
- Id. at 706.
- The Court of Appeals summarized the issue as:
- This appeal requires us to decide whether the First Amendment prevents a state
university from discharging a teacher whose pedagogical style and philosophy do
not conform to the pattern prescribed by the school administration.
- Id. at 706.
- After a through discussion, the Court of Appeals concluded:
- We do not accept plaintiff's assertion that the school administration abridged
her First Amendment rights when it refused to rehire her because it considered
her teaching philosophy to be incompatible with the pedagogical aims of the
University. Whatever may be the ultimate scope of the amorphous "academic
freedom" guaranteed to our Nation's teachers and students, [citations omitted]
it does not encompass the
right of a nontenured teacher to have her teaching style insulated from review
by her superiors when they determine whether she has merited tenured status
just because her methods and philosophy are considered acceptable somewhere
within the teaching profession.
- Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6thCir. 1973),
cert. den., 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
- Justice Douglas bless his heart
cast the sole vote to grant certiorari.
The Hetrick case is important because it concerns the
evaluation of teaching style, something that is part of a professor's
personality and individuality. Here, EKU was intolerant
of a professor who departed from the bland qualities that the
administration apparently desired. Further, there is an issue
of standards here. EKU is an accredited university that grants
bachelor's degrees. If the syllabus and teaching methods are
less challenging at EKU, than at other universities, then a
degree from EKU is worth less than a degree from a university
with higher academic standards (i.e., a more demanding curriculum).
If students at EKU are to be competitive in a national job market,
their best interests are served by giving them the same education
as at schools in, for example, New York state and Massachusetts.
Instead of seeing Dr. Hetrick as the problem, the real problem
is that the EKU administration was admitting students who could not do
college-level work, then dumbing down the academic program
to accommodate those substandard students.
At the conclusion of the case, quoted above, the Court of Appeals
characterized Dr. Hetrick's positions as desiring
"to have her teaching style insulated from review".
But that is not what she was requesting.
Her position was that terminating her employment violated her First Amendment
rights under "academic freedom" as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
There was no showing by EKU that Dr. Hetrick was either an ineffective
teacher or an incompetent scholar. Dr. Hetrick was fired
because her teaching style irritated the administration,
who then, in their attempt "to cast a pall of orthodoxy" over EKU,
dismissed Dr. Hetrick for reasons having nothing to do with her merit.
The Court of Appeals easily dispensed with this troubling case,
by mischaracterizing Dr. Hetrick's position as seeking
to avoid review, and by ignoring the issue of her alleged draft counseling.
Note that notions of academic freedom gave no protection to
Dr. Hetrick. Note also that both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals treated Dr. Hetrick as a mere at-will employee
who could be fired for any reason (except constitutionally
impermissible reasons, e.g., discrimination on race, religion, or gender).
For someone who believes that university administrators are
intelligent and enlightened people, who not only tolerate
but also respect individual differences of style and mannerisms,
the behavior of EKU was appalling.
Dr. Hetrick's case is not unusual, in fact it is well established law
that untenured professors are mere employees with the same
legal rights as a waitress in a restaurant or a clerk in a store.
The following quotations show that academic freedom offers no legal
protection to professors who irritate the university administration.
- But we do not conceive academic freedom to be a license for
uncontrolled expression at variance with established
curricular contents and internally destructive of the
proper functioning of the institution.
- Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7thCir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
- Academic freedom is not a license for activity at variance with
job related procedures and requirements, nor does it encompass
activities which are internally destructive to the proper
function of the university or disruptive to the education process.
.... Academic freedom does not mean freedom from academic
responsibility to students, colleagues and the orderly
administration of the university.
- Stastny v. Central Washington University, 647 P.2d 496, 504 (Wash.Ct.App. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1071 (1983).
The strong language quoted above (e.g., "internally destructive")
makes it appear that the plaintiff-professors put bombs in
campus buildings. In fact, Clark had some disagreements about
the content of classes and counselling students;
Stastny was absent while presenting a research paper at a seminar in Israel.
Dr. Wirsing was a tenured Professor of Education who believed that
teaching and learning can not be evaluated by any standardized approach.
As a result of her professional opinion, she refused to distribute
student evaluation forms to her students. The University retaliated
by refusing to give Dr. Wirsing a merit salary increase, although
a faculty evaluation committee had given the highest possible score to Dr. Wirsing's teaching.
Dr. Wirsing sued in federal court on grounds of interference with her
academic freedom. The district court granted summary judgment to the
University because Dr. Wirsing's conduct was not speech.
The district court quoted Stastny about academic freedom not
encompassing activities that are "internally destructive" or "disruptive of
the educational process", then declared:
- Further, although Dr. Wirsing may have a constitutionally protected
right under the First Amendment to disagree with the University's
policies, she has no right to evidence her disagreement by failing
to perform the duty imposed upon her as a condition of her employment.
- Wirsing v. University of Colorado, 739 F.Supp. 551, 553 (D.Colo. 1990),
aff'd without opinion, 945 F.2d 412 (10thCir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992).
In quoting from these cases, I do not imply that Clark, Stasny,
and Wirsing were correct and the university administrations were wrong.
I simply want to demonstrate that the doctrine of "academic freedom"
offers no legal protection to a wayward professor.
Academic freedom does not apply to ...
It is important to recognize that students do not have
academic freedom, in either Germany or the USA. Students are
on campus to learn, not to create new knowledge.
Even in the case of graduate students who are doing research for
their dissertations, the topic and methods are approved and
periodically reviewed by professors,
which is a level of supervision that would be
inappropriate for a professor's research.
Students are not colleagues of professors.
Despite some court opinions in the USA to the contrary,
academic freedom does not apply to teachers in elementary
and high schools. The following reasons for distinguishing
school teachers from university professors can be mentioned:
- School teachers teach well-known facts and methods
(e.g., reading, writing, arithmetic, history) to their pupils.
University professors not only teach cutting-edge knowledge
to their advanced students, but also professors are actively involved in
the creation of new knowledge and new methods.
- School teachers rarely write scholarly works that are published
in archival journals or books. University professors are
routinely expected to write scholarly works that are published
in peer-reviewed archival publications.
- School teachers have pupils who are between 5 and 18 years of age,
while university professors have students who are at least 18 years
of age (i.e., old enough to vote in political elections in the USA).
Public policy is abundantly clear that law will provide more protection
and governmental regulation for children (i.e., school pupils)
than for adults (i.e., university students).
Schools inculcate "American values" in pupils, while university students
are free to make their own conclusions.
Indeed, pupils are required by law to attend school, while
it is optional and voluntary for students to attend universities.
- School teachers usually have only a bachelor's or master's degree with
a major subject of "education". University professors generally
have earned a doctoral degree in the subject that they teach and
do research.
- As a result of the greater regulation of children than adults,
and as a result of the differences in academic qualifications of
school teachers and university professors:
- School teachers use textbooks that are chosen by state educational
committees. University professors make their own selection of
textbooks for classes that they teach.
- School teachers are required to follow a standard syllabus
that comes from the administration. In advanced courses,
university professors make their own syllabus and determine
for themselves the course content, methods, etc.
(i.e., individual control and autonomy).
In elementary courses, university professors follow a syllabus
that is written by a committee of professors in that department
at that university (i.e., control by local colleagues,
not by remote management).
In short, school teachers can not have academic freedom because such
teachers are not academics.
Only professors in colleges and universities are properly academics.
The careless word usage by judges (e.g., confusing pupils and students,
confusing school teachers and professors, confusing rights of students
with academic freedom) shows that judges have
not carefully considered the fundamental reasons for either academic freedom
or judicial review of educational decisions.
One gets the impression that judges carelessly use the phrase "academic freedom"
as buzz words, like motherhood, apple pie, and
waving the American flag.
Only a few reported court opinions mention the distinction between
schools and colleges:
- High schools may regulate the length of pupils hair,
but colleges may not regulate the length of student's hair.
Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 663 (5thCir. 1972),
cert. den., 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
- A court distinguished Pickering and Tinker,
two U.S. Supreme Court cases on freedom of speech in schools,
as not obviously applicable to a university environment.
Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1046-1048 (9thCir. 1976).
- "It could be argued, although we need not decide here, that an
educational institution possesses a different pattern of rights and
responsibilities and retains more of the traditional custodial
responsibilities when its students are all minors, as in an elementary
school, or mostly minors, as in a high school."
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 140 (3dCir. 1979),
cert. den., 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
Legal Barriers
Despite the literal promises of academic freedom for professors
in opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
there are three legal barriers to a professor enforcing his/her academic
freedom in a court of law.
- In my reading of more than 240 reported cases involving
professor v. university or
student v. university disputes
(excluding laboratory injury cases),
the university nearly always wins. This consistent result
speaks louder than any doctrine about academic freedom for professors,
or rights of people (e.g., professors or students) to fair treatment.
This refusal of judges to decide purely academic disputes is called
academic abstention.
However, judges will hear disputes involving
constitutional rights, which is the source of the academic freedom cases
that were cited above. I have written a separate essay,
Academic Abstention,
that quotes from many judicial opinions and law review articles,
as well as explains the mysterious origins of the doctrine of academic
abstention.
- Untenured professors are at-will employees. Under the doctrine of
at-will employment, an employer can dismiss an employee for any reason,
no reason at all, or even a morally repugnant reason, and courts
will not protect the former employee.
I have written a separate essay about the history and criticism of
at-will employment.
At-will employment makes academic freedom a very fragile right for
untenured professors.
- The rights of government employees (e.g., professors at a state university,
teachers in a public school) to freedom of speech have been restricted
in a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases since 1977.
See my separate essay on
freedom of speech.
Is Academic Freedom Different
in Different Disciplines?
The concept of Truth in science and mathematics is quite different
from the concept of Truth in the humanities.
Theorems in mathematics are rigorously proved.
There is a uniqueness theorem in differential equations that says
there can be only one solution, although there are different
ways to find, and to express, that solution.
Knowledge in physics and chemistry is susceptible to verification
by experiment. A hypothesis that can not be empirically tested
is inherently unscientific, although it may be an appropriate
hypothesis in another intellectual field, such as philosophy or history.
No competent scientist would seriously suggest that
the outcome of an experiment in physical science, or the outcome of
a mathematical calculation, would depend on
the race, religion, or political views of the observer.
However, in other areas (e.g., history, civics
so-called "political science", sociology, economics)
the concept of Truth can be elusive.
Interpretation of historical facts can depend on the
race, religion, or political views of the person making the interpretation.
The U.S. Supreme Court hinted at these differences in a case
involving a guest lecture by a socialist:
- No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes.
- Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
Does this mean that, for example, a civics professor has more
academic freedom than a physics professor, just because
Truth or correctness is more difficult to establish in
the study of government than in the study of physical law?
The fact that knowledge is asymptotically approaching some
unattainable final state of perfection should not prevent
us from saying that some statements are definitely false,
because they are contain a contradiction, or because they
disagree with experiment.
Here are some examples of where issues in academic freedom
could differ from one subject area to another.
For example:
- Corporate sponsorship of research at universities is generally
restricted to departments of science, engineering, and medicine
(who can produce results that are "useful" to the corporation), so
conflicts between loyalty to sponsors of research and loyalty to Truth are
generally restricted to professors in these departments.
- Public outrage about an opinion of a professor is
much more likely for subjects of social, political, or economic policy
than for science, mathematics, or engineering.
For example, a psychologist, sociologist, historian, economist, or
professor of civics might say something in the
course of his/her scholarly work that would upset citizens
outside the university. In contrast, can you imagine the public
getting upset over a dispute among physicists concerning
the mass of an electron? <grin>
- There are large differences in assessing the quality of a professor's
work. In physical science and mathematics, there is a unique
correct answer to each question, although there are generally
many ways to obtain this correct answer. In liberal arts, there
is often no consensus about Truth, Beauty, .... This difference
makes evaluations of professors in liberal arts more subjective
than evaluations of professors of science or mathematics.
There is nothing inherently wrong with subjective evaluations,
but they are more difficult to prove correct.
- Prohibiting a professor of physics, chemistry, mathematics, or
engineering from commenting in the classroom on politics would
have no effect on the quality of education in those subjects.
However, the same prohibition would seriously inhibit a professor
of history, civics, sociology, law, ....
From these differences, we can see why a professor in one department
might express academic freedom in different terms than a professor
in another department. Most judges have an educational background
in history, English literature, or some other discipline in the humanities
or in the so-called social sciences,
therefore judges would not be expected to see
the situation from the perspective of the sciences.
These differences in academic freedom occur naturally in different
departments of the university, and are routinely expressed, for example,
in the criteria for hiring faculty, and in making tenure, promotion,
and salary increase decisions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, academic freedom in the USA is a matter of internal
policy at colleges and universities. Academic freedom in the USA
is not a constitutional right belonging to professors.
Academic freedom can be a contract right granted to professors
by the administration of a college or university, but contract rights
are privately negotiated, not imposed by the Constitution.
In saying that academic freedom appears to be an unnecessary
concept in law of the USA, I am not expressing my personal
opinion of what the law should be, but only what the law really is.
In an utopia, a strong case could be made for giving the
most intelligent and the most creative individuals adequate resources
and freedom. But the USA is not that utopia.
ASIDE: There is
a long history of discrimination against, and open contempt of,
intellectuals in the USA, as documented in Richard Hofstadter's book
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1963).
This disdain for intellectuals even appears in common English-language
phrases, such as "it is [only] of academic interest", which means
that something is of no practical importance, or the image of
a university community as an "ivory tower" that is disconnected from "the real world".
In fact, experiments done by scientists and engineers in university
laboratories are just as real as those done in industrial laboratories.
Phrases like "academic interest" and "ivory tower" are only
labels to denigrate and marginalize intellectuals.
What universities and professors really need is not meaningless words
about the importance of "academic freedom" from judges, but
adequate financial support for professors' salaries, and
adequate financial support for scientific equipment and research expenses,
libraries, buildings, etc.
Academic freedom means nothing if professors can not afford
to do the research that they are supposedly free to do.
I have a separate essay
that discusses the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
on freedom of speech for government employees, which include
professors at state universities and teachers in public schools.
That essay concludes with a brief discussion of a few cases
in which lower courts considered the freedom of speech for professors
at state universities, specifically when the professor is
critical of the university's administration.
Finally, I have a long essay
on wrongful discharge cases under state law in which a learned
professional (e.g., attorney, physician, nurse, engineer, or
scientist) has his/her employment terminated because the employee
chose to follow professional ethics, instead of follow his/her manager's
commands. While none of the reported cases involve a professor,
such law might be a future possibility for professors to fight
an unjust dismissal or failure to renew their contract.
Short bibliography
There is a large literature on academic freedom, mostly written by
professors, and mostly consisting of self-serving praise and
unsupported assertions.
However, I can recommend the following as containing substantial
information and deep intellectual content:
- Richard Hofstadter, Academic Freedom in the Age of the College,
Columbia University Press (1961).
A history of academic freedom in the USA,
from the founding of Harvard College in 1636, up to 1860.
Colleges in the USA during this period of time were mostly
controlled by churches and devoted to teaching undergraduate students.
- Walter P. Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University,
Columbia University Press (1961).
A history of academic freedom in the USA from 1865 to 1917,
the time during which ideas of academic freedom were imported from Germany
and the time during which the modern university devoted
to scholarly research began to appear in the USA.
Pages 139 to 193 summarize the dismissal of professors for
expressing their political opinions, which dismissals lead to
the formation of the American Association of University Professors.
- Virginia Davis Nordin, "The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable
Theory of the Student-University Relationship",
8 J. Coll. & Univ. Law 141 (1981-82).
As the title suggests, this article is concerned with disputes
between students and universities, not academic freedom.
This article is included in this bibliography not only
because it contains an insightful analysis of academic abstention,
but also because Nordin was apparently the first person to
recognize and articulate the doctrine of academic abstention.
- Katheryn Katz, "The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive
Activity in the University Classroom: A Constitutional Myth",
16 Univ. Calif. Davis Law Review 857 (1983).
- Walter P. Metzger, "Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America", 66 Texas Law Review 1265 (1988).
- Matthew W. Finkin, "Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment",
66 Texas Law Review 1323 (1988).
- J. Peter Byrne, "Academic Freedom", 99 Yale Law Journal 251, 252-253 (1989).
- Walter P. Metzger, "The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure",
53 Law & Contemporary Problems 3 (1990).
- William W. Van Alstyne, "Academic Freedom and the First Amendment ...",
53 Law & Contemporary Problems 79 (1990).
The author is imminently qualified: he is a professor of law
at Duke University, an expert on first-amendment law, and
a past president and general counsel of the American Association
of University Professors. However, his analysis is conventional:
he ignores the doctrine of academic abstention.
While normally I would recommend reading opinions of
U.S. Supreme Court, those opinions are not particularly helpful in
the area of academic freedom. The justices have failed to provide a
precise definition of academic freedom. The justices have failed
to provide a justification for academic freedom. And, to properly
interpret the effusive prose that the justices have written about
academic freedom, one must first have a detailed understanding of
First Amendment law, which itself is a complex and evolving area
of law.
this document is at http://www.rbs2.com/afree.htm
My most recent search for court cases on this topic was in July 1999.
version 3 July 2000, link to academic abstention essay added 1 June 2007.
return to my homepage